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Karl Lagerfeld's quick wit and silver tongue are as notorious as Chanel's quilted handbag. This book is a cornucopia of his Karlisms: cultivated, unpredictable. Online PDF The World According to Karl, Read PDF The World According to Karl, Full PDF The World According to Karl, All Ebook The World According to Karl. THE WORLD ACCORDING TO. KANYE . truth and sincerity in a world of processed information. Art, love, and Angelou, or Karl Lagerfeld, or something.

Fuhrmans , lxvii. In contrast, Krause explicitly refers to his system of philosophy as panentheism, cf. Krause , Hegel and Krause were colleagues in Jena, lecturing at the same time.

Benedikt P. A notable exception is McFarland , Krause was well aware that his project to develop and deploy a purely German scientific language had a huge opposition. This contains the following composite thought: The sun is something finite; it is part of its higher whole, that is, the universe. Furthermore, the mentioned limitation is only the limitation of the sun—not the whole of nature, as a whole, is limited thereby.

We do not assert that God as such is a particular finite I. In general, as I have argued elsewhere cf. The more complex is constituted of the less complex, and all interact and interrelate Zygon in systems of systems.

It is to this world discovered by the sciences that we have to think of God as relating. The Panentheistic Turn in Modern Theology.

Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, 1— Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. Clayton, Philip.

Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, 73— Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press. Cooper, John W. Davies, Paul. Philip Clayton and Paul Davies, Ix—xiv. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The World According to Karl

Edwards, Denis. Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, — Ferm, Vergilius. An Encyclopedia of Religion. New York: The Philosophical Library. Fuhrmans, Horst. Schelling: Das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, 19— Hartshorne, Charles. Charles Hartshorne and W. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Mircea Eliade, Vol. New York: Macmillan. Krause, Karl Christian Friedrich.

Prague: Tempsky. Abriss des Systems der Philosophie. Leipzig: Otto Schulze. Philosophische Abhandlungen. Der Begriff der Philosophie. Der Menschheitbund. Berlin: Felber. The Ideal of Humanity and Universal Federation, trans. Edinburgh: T.

The Family: A Pansophic Ideal. McFarland, Thomas. Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition. Oxford: Clarendon Press. McInnes, Neil. Edwards, Vol. New York: Free Press. Freyberg privately printed. Kampen, The Netherlands: Pharos.

(EXHILARATED) The World According to Karl ebook eBook PDF

Palmquist, Stephen. Peacocke, Arthur. Karl Christian Friedrich Krause. Eine Biographie. Stuttgart—Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-holzboog. Erste Abtheilung enthaltend die allgemeine Philosophie, nebst einer Anleitung zur Naturphilosophie.

Jena und Leipzig , ed. Bach and O. Zweig, Arnulf. However, whereas Kant saw transcendental ideas as the formal-regulative ideas of reason, serving, at most, to confer systematic organization on reason's immanent operations, Jaspers viewed transcendental ideas as realms of lived knowledge, through which consciousness passes and by whose experienced antinomies it is formed and guided to a knowledge of itself as transcendent.

Jaspers thus attributed to transcendental ideas a substantial and experiential content. Ideas do not, as for Kant, simply mark the formal limits of knowledge, marking out the bounds of sense against speculative or metaphysical questions. Instead, ideas provide a constant impulsion for reason to overcome its limits, and to seek an ever more transcendent knowledge of itself, its contents and its possibilities. In his mature philosophy, therefore, Jaspers transformed the Kantian transcendental ideas into ideas of transcendence, in which consciousness apprehends and elaborates the possibility of substantial or metaphysical knowledge and self-knowledge.

Central to this adjustment to Kant's conception of ideas was also an implied, yet quite fundamental critique of the key Kantian distinction between the transcendent and the transcendental. In contrast to contemporary neo-Kantian readings of Kant, which were prepared to acknowledge the ideal element in Kantian idealism only, at most, as a regulative framework, generated by reason's own autonomous functions, Jaspers argued that Kantian philosophy always at once contains and suppresses a vision of experienced transcendence, and that the Kantian ideas should be viewed as challenges to reason to think beyond the limits of its autonomy, towards new and more authentic contents, self-experiences and freedoms.

In replacing the transcendental with the transcendent, however, Jaspers did not argue that transcendent contents are obtainable as positive elements of human knowledge. On the contrary, he argued that consciousness only acquires knowledge of its transcendence by contemplating the evanescent ciphers of transcendence, which signify the absolute limits of human consciousness.

These ciphers might be encountered in nature, in art, in religious symbolism, or in metaphysical philosophy.

But it is characteristic of all ciphers that, in alluding to transcendence, they also withhold transcendent knowledge from consciousness, and that they can only act as indices of the impossibility of such knowledge. The attitude of consciousness which apprehends its limits and its possible transcendence can therefore only be an attitude of foundering or failing Scheitern , and transcendence can intrude in human consciousness only as an experience of the absolute insufficiency of this consciousness for interpreting its originary or metaphysical character.

At this level, then, although opposing the formality and experiential vacuity of neo-Kantianism, Jaspers also accepted the original Kantian prohibition on positive transcendent or metaphysical knowledge. He argued that consciousness always has a metaphysical orientation to be other than, or transcendent to, its existing forms, but he also claimed that this orientation can only factually culminate in a crisis of transcendence, or in a crisis of metaphysics.

Jaspers intuited that Kantian transcendentalism suppressed a deep-lying impulse for transcendence, and this aspect of Kant's thought was badly neglected by interpreters who saw Kant's philosophy as a doctrine of pure immanence or autonomy.

Adorno's later argument that Kant's transcendental idealism always contains a lament over the closure of reason against transcendence was thus anticipated by Jaspers, albeit in subjectivist terms, and Jaspers and Adorno—for all their political differences—can be placed close together as thinkers who endeavoured to revitalize the metaphysical traces in idealism.

Similarly, it is also not difficult to identify the ways in which his work was influenced by Nietzsche. Jaspers borrowed from Nietzsche a psychologistic approach to philosophical perspectives, and, like Nietzsche, he tended to view philosophical claims, not as formally verifiable postulates, but as expressions of underlying mental dispositions.

For this reason, he also borrowed from Nietzsche a dismissive approach to absolutized claims to truthful knowledge, and a resultant rejection of all rational purism. Most especially, however, like Heidegger, he took from Nietzsche a critical approach to the residues of metaphysics in European philosophy, and he denied the existence of essences which are external or indifferent to human experience. At the same time, however, Jaspers also clearly positioned his philosophy against many elements of the Nietzschean legacy.

He was clearly opposed to the naturalistic vitalism evolving from Nietzsche's work, and his emphasis on human subjectivity as a locus of truthful transcendence meant that Kierkegaard, rather than Nietzsche, was the existential prototype for his work.

Although he was at times critical of the simple mysticism and the metaphysics of natural process in Schelling's religious works, his metaphysical reconstruction of Kantian idealism rearticulated some elements of the positive philosophy of the later Schelling, and it mirrored his attempt to account for truthful knowledge as a cognitive experience in which reason is transfigured by its encounter with contents other than its own form.

In this respect, Jaspers adopted from Schelling a non-identitarian model of cognitive life, which views true or truthful knowledge as obtained through acts of positive interpretation and revelation at the limits of rational consciousness. Unlike Schelling, he always rejected claims to absolute positive knowledge; to this extent, he remained—in the ultimate analysis—a Kantian philosopher.

However, he was clearly sympathetic to Schelling's critique of formal epistemological negativism.

Indeed, through his hermeneutical transformation of idealism into a metaphysics of symbolic interpretation, he might be seen, like both Schelling and Johann Georg Hamann before him, as a philosopher who was intent on re-invoking the truth of revelation, as an absolute and non-identical content of knowledge, against the rational evidences of epistemology, and so on elaborating an interpretive methodology adapted to a conception of truth as disclosed or revealed. At one level, Jaspers was philosophically committed to a sympathetic retrieval of religious contents.

He was insistent that truth can only be interpreted as an element of radical alterity in reason, or as reason's experience of its own limits. Similarly, he was insistent that the conditions of human freedom are not generated by human reason alone, but are experienced as incursions of transcendence in rational thought. For these reasons, his philosophy is sympathetic towards the primary implications of revelation theology, and it cautiously upholds the essential philosophical claim of revelation: namely, that truth is a disclosure of otherness transcendence to reason, or at least an interpreted moment of otherness in reason.

At the same time, however, Jaspers cannot in any obvious way be described as a religious philosopher. In fact, he was very critical of revelation theology, and of orthodox religions more generally, on a number of quite separate counts. First, he argued that the centre of religion is always formed by a falsely objectivized or absolutized claim to truth, which fails to recognize that transcendence occurs in many ways, and that transcendent truths cannot be made concrete as a set of factual statements or narratives.

Religious world views are therefore examples of limited mental attitudes, which seek a hold in uniform doctrine in order to evade a confrontation with the uncertainty and instability of transcendence.

In positing transcendence as a realized element of revelation, religion in fact obstructs the capacity for transcendence which all people possess; religion claims to offer transcendence, but it actually obstructs it. Second, then, as the foundations of dogma and doctrinal orthodoxy, revealed truth-claims eliminate the self-critical and communicative aspect of human reason, and they undermine the dialogical preconditions of transcendence and existential self-knowledge.

Jaspers thus viewed orthodox religion as an obstruction to communication, which places dogmatic limits on the common human capacity for truthfulness and transcendence. Nonetheless, as a philosopher of transcendence, he was also clear that human truthfulness, or humanity more generally, cannot be conceived without a recuperation of religious interpretive approaches and without a recognition of the fact that the founding contents of philosophy are transcendent.

Much of his work, in consequence, might be construed as an attempt to free the contents of religious thinking from the dogmatic orthodoxies imposed upon these contents in the name of organized religion. This notoriously difficult concept contains a number of quite distinct meanings. First, it means that true philosophy must be guided by a faith in the originary transcendence of human existence, and that philosophy which negatively excludes or ignores its transcendent origin falls short of the highest tasks of philosophy.

Second, however, it also means that true philosophy cannot simply abandon philosophical rationality for positively disclosed truth-contents or dogma, and that the critical function of rationality has a constitutive role in the formation of absolute knowledge.

In this respect, Jaspers revisited some of the controversies concerning the relation between religion and philosophy which shaped the philosophy of the Young Hegelians in the s. Like the Young Hegelians, he insisted that faith needs philosophy, and faith devalues its contents wherever these are dogmatically or positively proclaimed.

Third, then, this concept also indicates that the evidences of faith are always paradoxical and uncertain and that those who pursue knowledge of these contents must accept an attitude of philosophical relativism and discursive exchange: if faith results in dogmatism, it immediately undermines its claims to offer transcendent knowledge. The concept of philosophical faith is thus proposed, not as a doctrine of factual revelation or accomplished transcendence, but as a guide to transcendent communication, which balances the element of disclosure in faith with a critical philosophical veto on the absolutism of religious claims, and which consequently insists that transcendent knowledge must be accepted as relative and incomplete.

In this regard, Jaspers held the religious aspects of his philosophy on a fine dialectic between theological and anthropological assertions.

He implied, at one level, that purely secularist accounts of human life occlude existence against its originary transcendent possibilities and freedoms.

At the same time, however, he also suggested that pure theological analysis closes humanity against the relativity and precariousness of its truths, and against the communicative processes through which these truths are disclosed.

Only philosophy which can at once embrace and relativize secularism and embrace and relativize religion is able to undertake adequate existential inquiry, and philosophy which, in either direction, abandons the dialectical edge between these two commitments ceases to be genuine philosophy.

This critical-recuperative attitude towards religious inquiry was fundamental to many of the public controversies in which Jaspers engaged. The religious elements of his work came under attack from the Calvinist theologian, Karl Barth, who denounced the lack of objective religious content in his concept of transcendence.

More significantly, though, Jaspers also entered into a lengthy and influential controversy with Rudolf Bultmann, the resonances of which still impact on liberal theological debate. At the time when Bultmann first proposed this de-mythologizing approach Jaspers was widely although erroneously identified with the liberal wing of Protestant theology, and it was perhaps expected that he might declare sympathy for Bultmann's hermeneutical approach.

Jaspers, however, turned sharply on Bultmann. In opposition to Bultmann, therefore, Jaspers concluded that only a religious hermeneutic based in absolute liberality, excluding all orthodoxy, could be appropriate to the task of interpreting the transcendent contents of human life.

Interpretive methods which efface the traces of historical contingency from transcendence and reduce transcendence to one predetermined religious truth, he suggested, fail to reflect on the plural and various forms in which transcendence can be interpreted, they erroneously presuppose that transcendence can be encased in the categories of one exclusive doctrine, and they undervalue the constitutive historical variability of transcendence.

As a consequence, Jaspers argued implicitly for the importance of mythical or symbolic forms in religious inquiry, and he indicated that both myth and religion contain, in similar measure, the interpreted residues of transcendence.

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His analysis of religion culminated in a discussion of Trinitarian theology which, echoing Ludwig Feuerbach's anthropological analysis, asserted that the three parts of the trinity should be interpreted, not as factual elements of deity, but as symbolic ciphers of human possibility.

In this, he ascribed particular significance to the second person of the Trinity, Jesus Christ, as a cipher for the human existential possibility of inner change, reversal and transformation. Wherever this cipher is hypostatically defined as mere positive fact of belief, he concluded however, the freedom of transcendence obtained through the sympathetic interpretation and recuperation of this cipher is obstructed.

Indeed, the ambition behind his work on religion and myth was no less than to liberate transcendence from theology, and to permit an interpretive transformation of religiously conceived essences into the free moments of human self-interpretation. If his thought can truly be placed in the terrain of theological discourse, therefore, his approach to religion is one of extreme liberalism and latitudinarianism, which dismisses the claim that transcendence is exclusively or even predominantly disclosed by religion.

The truth of religion, he intimated, only becomes true if it is interpreted as a human truth, not as a truth originally external or prior to humanity. In its orthodox form, however, religion normally prevents the knowledge of transcendence which it purports to offer.

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In fact, his criticism of religious dogmatism evolved in conjunction with a wider doctrine of humanism, which ultimately became the defining component of his later work. Arguably, Jaspers was always a humanist; certainly, if humanism is defined as a doctrine which seeks to account for the specificity, uniqueness and dignity of human life his work can, from the outset, be seen as a variant on philosophical humanism.

The argument runs through all his early works that human beings are distinguished by the fact that they have authentic attributes of existence and transcendence—that is, by their ability to raise questions about themselves and their freedoms which cannot be posed in material or scientific terms, and by their resultant capacity for decisive reversal, self-transformation and transcendence. True humanity is thus a condition of free self-possession and transcendent authenticity.

In general terms, existentialism can be divided between philosophers, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, who defined existentialism as a humanism, and those, such as Heidegger, who saw the organization of philosophy around the analysis of human determinacy as a metaphysical corruption of philosophy. Jaspers clearly belonged to the first category of existential philosophers. On His Sunglasses. On Luxury. Bertrand Rindoff Petroff Getty Images. On Fashion. Kurt Vinion Getty Images. On Men.

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The World According to Karl

On Emotions. On Being Contro-versial. On Life. On Money. On His Legacy. Advertisement - Continue Reading Below. More From What to Read in George Soros likens it to the kind of smashing ball used to demolish tall buildings. At first, these relationships—together with their legal and political expression—assist the development of the productive forces.

Over and above the commentary itself, the edition is designed to provide new impulses for research on the philosopher and to enable the debates on present-day cultural and political issues to profit from a species of thinking that can be described as interdisciplinary and cosmopolitan in the best sense of those terms. He taught successfully there for some time, but once again failed to obtain a tenured position. He was a research assistant in the psychiatric clinic of the university of Heidelberg from —, where he worked with some of the most famous psychiatrists in Germany, including Nissl, Wilmanned, Gruhle, and Mayer-Gross.

Instead, the one principle of recognition and being is the original unity of these categories and as such is indistinguishable from their union. On Fashion.

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